Theoretical analysis reveals the hard problem of consciousness as a category error in metaphysical frameworks, indicating subjective qualia are projected tensorial invariants.
We apply the Metaphysic of the Intelligible and the Category Error Detector (CED) to the Hard Problem of Consciousness—the question of why physical processes feel like something from the inside. We show that the Hard Problem is a category error arising from the collapse of two ir- reducible axes: the physical (contingent) and the experiential (abstract). Once the axes are restored, qualia are revealed as tensorial invariants of the self-referential interface. Consciousness is not generated—it is pro- jected. The Hard Problem dissolves.
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Theriault et al. (2026) studied this question.
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