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Comparative legal analysis demonstrates fragmented protections for deceased individuals across jurisdictions, highlighting the need for a unified framework safeguarding posthumous dignity.
Death ordinarily terminates legal personality, yet modern legal systems repeatedly protect interests that remain intelligible only by reference to the deceased. The law regulates the custody and disposal of human remains, honours funeral wishes, preserves reputation and creative attribution, controls organ and tissue use, and increasingly confronts digital accounts and artificial-intelligence replicas. This article argues that these protections should not be forced into the fiction that the dead remain full legal persons. Nor should they be reduced entirely to the grief or property interests of survivors. A more coherent account recognises posthumous dignity as a bounded legal interest: grounded in the ante-mortem autonomy and social identity of the deceased, administered by living representatives, and limited by the rights of relatives, free expression, public health, criminal justice, historical inquiry and medical necessity. Using doctrinal, comparative and interdisciplinary methods, the article examines Indian constitutional jurisprudence alongside French legislation, the law of England and Wales, European human-rights decisions, international humanitarian standards and selected United States publicity statutes. It finds that India has developed a strong constitutional vocabulary of dignified treatment and decent burial under Article 21, but relies on a fragmented set of criminals, transplant, procedural and data rules. The fragmentation becomes acute when identity survives as data capable of being searched, monetised and used to generate convincing synthetic performances. The article therefore proposes a Posthumous Dignity and Interests Act built around five protected domains: bodily integrity; funerary autonomy; identity and reputation; data and digital persona; and equality in death administration. The model gives priority to recorded wishes, creates a representative with fiduciary duties, imposes provenance and consent rules on AI replicas, and preserves proportionate exceptions. The central claim is modest but consequential: death should narrow rights, not erase the legally protected significance of the person who lived.
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Dhanashri M. Chougale (2026) studied this question.
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