Collaborative innovation in biological breeding for wheat leaf rust resistance: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Key common agricultural technologies are the core driving force for upgrading the agricultural industrial chain. This paper takes the development of biological breeding technology for wheat leaf rust resistance as a scenario, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, wheat breeding enterprises, and agricultural and forestry universities, and introduces factors such as the success probability of technology, technology spillover coefficient, and revenue distribution ratio. Through replicator dynamic equations and numerical simulation, it analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies of the collaborative innovation system and their influencing mechanisms. The research results show that: (1) The government’s social benefits and support costs are the key threshold factors affecting the government’s strategy choice; the government’s active support strategy is sustainable and effectively transmitted to wheat breeding enterprises and agricultural and forestry universities. (2) The participation willingness of wheat breeding enterprises is significantly constrained by the research and development costs of biological breeding technology for wheat leaf rust resistance and the losses from technological failure. (3) The willingness of agricultural and forestry universities to deeply cooperate is comprehensively influenced by multiple factors such as financial support for biological breeding technology for wheat leaf rust resistance, revenue from achievements, academic reputation, and the collaborative demands of wheat breeding enterprises. (4) The revenue distribution mechanism has a significant regulatory effect on the system’s evolution. The revenue distribution ratio for wheat breeding enterprises has a positive incentive effect on their participation willingness, while the regulatory role of the revenue distribution ratio for agricultural and forestry universities needs to be coordinated with government investment and the participation of wheat breeding enterprises in collaboration. The findings clarify how public value, technical risk, spillovers, and benefit allocation jointly shape collaborative breeding and provide a basis for staged support, risk-sharing, and benefit-allocation mechanisms.