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Economic modeling reveals substantial parental overinvestment driven by college admissions competition, suggesting that taxing private education and subsidizing public investment improves welfare.
To study how college‐admissions competition shapes parental investment and child‐development policies, we develop a heterogeneous‐agent life‐cycle model in which parents invest in children's human capital to raise future labor productivity and compete for limited college seats. Because families ignore their spending's effects on others' admission chances, competition creates a rat race with overinvestment. Estimating the model with Chinese data, we find that this externality accounts for a substantial share of parental monetary investment. Policies that reduce competition raise current‐generation welfare but may diminish future human capital. Taxing private education spending while subsidizing public investment can balance this trade‐off and improve overall welfare.
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Gu et al. (2026) studied this question.
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