When is it really security? A two-test method for screening security-of-supply and wider security arguments in financing decisions

Security arguments are appearing more often in financing. When a project is said to serve the security of a country or region, that claim can tip a funding decision, especially for mandate-driven institutions weighing more than risk and return. But if any project can be dressed in security language, the label sorts nothing, and there is no ready-made standard for testing such claims when screening a financing proposal. This brief proposes one: a two-test method. Test A asks whether it is genuinely a security case at all, is a public benefit at stake, is there a specific threat to a critical, hard-to-substitute dependence, and is the ask proportionate. Test B asks whether the financing truly strengthens security and is real, is it anchored in adopted public policy, recognised by the responsible authority, additional, matched by actual practice, and demonstrable in its mechanism. A case must pass both. The method is set out with food and agriculture as the illustrative sector, drawing on the security-of-supply frameworks of the five Nordic and three Baltic states, but it generalises to defence, infrastructure, and information security. The word "securitisation" is used here in its security-studies sense (treating something as a matter of security), not its financial one. The brief is accompanied by a two-page executive summary and a working matrix.