The philosophy of action science

Describes how there are unsolved problems within the philosophy of the social sciences, which cannot provide a coherent account of a style of science which is based on either explanation or understanding. No easy combination of elements from the empiricist and hermeneutic approaches is possible because of radically different epistemologies. Shows how, against this background of philosophical insecurity, action science seems to offer new possibilities by incorporating a form of practice of research which is aimed at understanding meaning, while at the same time retaining enough of the characteristics of the ideal of scientific reliability (hard data, explicit inference, public testing) to free it from the danger of uncritically adopting the internal viewpoint of participants. It is free from commitment to empiricist epistemological principles, so that it can combine elements of the explanatory and interpretative poles in a coherent way. Argues that it is a valuable contribution which can advance the discussion within the philosophy of the social sciences.