On the Conceptual Overstretch of Weaponized Interdependence in Lithium and Rare‐Earth Element Markets

This paper critically examines the conceptual overstretch of weaponized interdependence (WI) in analyses of China's dominance over lithium and rare‐earth element (REE) markets. Although WI has become a central framework for interpreting EU–China economic relations, its application to raw materials often extends beyond the theory's original scope. Drawing on Farrell and Newman's framework, the paper identifies three major overstretches—the State–Firm Alignment Fallacy, the Network Rigidity Illusion, and the Unilateral Dependency Bias—that undermine the analytical precision of WI and distort assessments of China's coercive capacity. Through qualitative evidence from REE and lithium markets, the paper shows that China's leverage is constrained by fragmented domestic governance, adaptive market responses, and reciprocal dependencies. Overgeneralized uses of WI risk legitimizing securitized “de‐coupling” strategies that exacerbate global policy fragmentation. The paper argues for a more differentiated understanding of interdependence, centered on cooperative resilience rather than on zero‐sum narratives of economic coercion.