Europe's ambitious energy transition risks replacing strategic dependence on Russian fossil fuels with dependence on Chinese critical raw materials. While concerns over mineral weaponisation are widespread, empirical assessments of China's actual supply-chain leverage remain underexplored. Bridging this gap, this article applies a disciplined interpretative case study design and realist theory to construct an analytical model to assess whether Beijing weaponises its position vis-à-vis the EU. It traces China's strategic behaviour between 2013 and 2025 across four commodities crucial for renewable technologies: gallium, magnesium, rare earth elements, and vanadium. The analysis reveals that Beijing has systematically consolidated state control over these sectors. Rare earth elements and vanadium pose the highest risk of weaponisation due to export restrictions, investment barriers, and stockpiling, whereas magnesium exhibits the fewest strategic indicators. Furthermore, although China has deployed targeted export bans against the United States, it has exercised strategic restraint toward Europe. The study concludes that while the structural capacity for coercion is deeply embedded in China's mineral governance, overt weaponisation remains highly selective, suggesting that dependent nations must prioritise diversification in the most vulnerable supply chains.
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Nikoléniová et al. (2026) studied this question.
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