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Quotas and tariffs are compared in a two-stage Cournot duopoly game where R&D is chosen initially and output is selected subsequently. Imposing a quota at or below the free-trade import level results in either a pure-strategy or a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Compared to an equally restrictive tariff, a quota leads to higher domestic profits, but lower domestic output and R&D (in a pure-strategy equilibrium). Furthermore, a quota and a tariff may often produce opposite effects on domestic R&D. A quota set above the free-trade import level may become binding and may lead to multiple equilibria.
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James D. Reitzes (1991) studied this question.
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