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Reverse engineering analysis reveals Apple notarization mechanics on a minimal four-byte Mach-O binary, indicating standalone executables verify online despite local stapling errors.
This article is meant to show a solid reverse engineering methodology, and how we work with notarization. We decided to use a very simple program (only four bytes of code) rather than something more complex exactly to highlight the undertaken steps. We opted for this solution also to avoid copyright breaches. This exercise will show that only four bytes of code end up in a 16888-byte program, due to the dynamic linking and other mechanisms that are out of the current scope; three out of five pages are zeros, and the signature covers those too. Interestingly, Apple notarizes a program containing just four bytes of executable code. This has been properly shown; however stapling fails with error 73: the stapler looks for Contents/CodeResources inside a file that it had just identified as not being a directory. The ticket is generated and downloaded regardless: 45 bytes of content, 20 of which make up the cdhash, containing the CloudKit record timestamp. Even without the ticket, the binary is recognised as notarized; verification takes place online.Every byte of the binary pertaining to the signature is accounted for, including the blob. No Mach-O header or other similar analyses have been performed, for clarity and brevity purposes.
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Gabriel Biondo (2026) studied this question.
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