Intrinsic value and its commitments: a response to the Conguillío Statement

The Conguillío Statement asserts that ecosystems possess intrinsic value and presents this claim as part of the normative responsibilities of ecologists. Although such language is common in ecology, it is rarely accompanied by a sustained philosophical defense. This paper clarifies what would be required for the claim to succeed. If intrinsic value is understood in a modest, attitude‐dependent sense – where ecosystems are valued for their own sake by individuals or communities – the claim is defensible but generates only limited, indirect reasons for protection. If, however, intrinsic value is understood in a stronger, objective sense capable of grounding binding, universalizable moral duties, the justificatory burden is substantially higher. I argue that ecosystems are unlikely to meet the conditions required for such strong claims. They lack the features – such as consciousness, interests, or unified welfare – that have traditionally grounded intrinsic value, and attempts to extend or pluralize these grounds fail to provide clear guidance in cases of conflict. As a result, appeals to intrinsic value either yield reasons too weak to support the responsibilities often attributed to them, or require a philosophical defense that has not been supplied. The intrinsic value claim should therefore be treated not as an established foundation for conservation, but as a substantive and contested philosophical position. Conservation goals can be defended without relying on it as a foundational moral premise.