What does this research mean for the field?

The claim that ecosystems possess intrinsic value is either too weak to support conservation responsibilities or lacks sufficient philosophical justification, and therefore should not be used as a foundational moral premise for conservation. Novelty: ClaimNovelty.CONTRADICTORY. Consensus alignment: ConsensusAlignment.CHALLENGES_CONSENSUS.

What question did this study set out to answer?

To evaluate whether claims that ecosystems possess intrinsic value can philosophically justify binding moral duties in ecological conservation.

September 5, 2026OikosOpen Access

Intrinsic value and its commitments: a response to the Conguillío Statement

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Authors

JNJonathan A. Newman

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Overview

Conceptual analysis demonstrates that ecosystems lack traditional foundations for objective intrinsic value, indicating conservation policies can succeed without contested moral claims.

Key Points

To evaluate whether claims that ecosystems possess intrinsic value can philosophically justify binding moral duties in ecological conservation.
Conducted a conceptual analysis of the Conguillío Statement by distinguishing modest attitude-dependent value from strong objective value.
Evaluated ecosystem properties against standard philosophical criteria for intrinsic value, including consciousness, interests, and unified welfare.
Modest, attitude-dependent intrinsic value is defensible but produces only weak, indirect reasons for environmental protection.
Ecosystems lack consciousness, sentience, and unified welfare, leaving strong claims of universal moral duties philosophically unsupported.
Conservation frameworks can effectively justify environmental protection goals without relying on intrinsic value as an unproven foundational premise.

Cite This Study

Jonathan A. Newman (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a9bd3c76b95aff0620eafa1 https://doi.org/10.1002/oik.12467

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September 5, 2026OikosOpen Access

Intrinsic value and its commitments: a response to the Conguillío Statement

View Full Paper

Ask AI

Bookmark

Authors

JNJonathan A. Newman

Discussion

Member takes

Overview

Conceptual analysis demonstrates that ecosystems lack traditional foundations for objective intrinsic value, indicating conservation policies can succeed without contested moral claims.

Key Points

To evaluate whether claims that ecosystems possess intrinsic value can philosophically justify binding moral duties in ecological conservation.
Conducted a conceptual analysis of the Conguillío Statement by distinguishing modest attitude-dependent value from strong objective value.
Evaluated ecosystem properties against standard philosophical criteria for intrinsic value, including consciousness, interests, and unified welfare.
Modest, attitude-dependent intrinsic value is defensible but produces only weak, indirect reasons for environmental protection.
Ecosystems lack consciousness, sentience, and unified welfare, leaving strong claims of universal moral duties philosophically unsupported.
Conservation frameworks can effectively justify environmental protection goals without relying on intrinsic value as an unproven foundational premise.

Cite This Study

Jonathan A. Newman (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a9bd3c76b95aff0620eafa1 https://doi.org/10.1002/oik.12467

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