Computational framework demonstrates pre-deployment safety verification for neuro-symbolic edge agents, ensuring reliable bounds for resource-constrained humanitarian hardware.
Runtime guardrails for LLM agents enforce safety per individual action at execution time, but fail to verify the reachable state space before deployment. We present BeVerA-KG, a behaviour-driven framework that shifts verification to design time. Stakeholder-authored Gherkin scenarios are deterministically compiled into OWL 2 DL disjointness axioms (HermiT-verified for schema consistency) and paired with SPARQL 1.1 ASK guards for runtime defence-in-depth. The composed agent model is statistically analyzed as a priced timed automaton via UPPAAL statistical model checking (≥26,500 Monte Carlo runs, providing ≥ 0.99 confidence with ≤ 0.01 error per the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound), and re-verified post-quantization to ensure safety invariants survive deployment on ultra-constrained humanitarian edge hardware (<150 MB footprint, <200 ms latency for the symbolic engine). We formalise the statistical assurance as Pr[□ϕ(s)∧♦ψ(s)] ≥ 0.99 over reachable states—providing broader pre-deployment assurance than per-action enforcement alone—and contribute a twelve-scenario guardrail suite grounded in field census data, a machine-auditable test harness, and an open-source compliance pipeline.
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Behailu Wolde (2026) studied this question.
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