Conceptual analysis reveals distinct operational structures of identity discontinuity in personal transformations, suggesting institutional criteria independent of subjective mental states.
Highlights · Four transitions usually treated as one are four different operations. Joining the Foreign Legion, disappearing as a jouhatsu, entering a monastery and being transformed by a near-fatal illness share a description and share no structure. · A source can be given and cannot be taken. An external party that assumes an origination does not relocate it but destroys it, leaving power with the discipline intact. “Taken” names an inversion, not a transfer. · The reports converge because the source is what survives. In every case the layer doing the narrating is the one layer no external party holds — which explains James’s unification without accepting it. · A monastery and a high-control group can be identical in every layer but one. Same substrate transfer, same new name, same replaced practice, same severity. The difference is whether the source was given or taken. · The obvious way to test for that difference fails, and the paper’s own framework predicts the failure. Source-protection provisions are appropriable and displayable, so the Capture Law says they will be operated by the organisations they were meant to assess. · What survives is one-sided. Presence of a provision is uninformative because it is cheap; absence is informative because omission is costly. And whether a provision has ever been exercised is not fakeable at all. · Eileen Barker’s method becomes the instrument rather than the objection. Members free to leave, leaving in large numbers, is the behavioural evidence the criterion needs. · Anonymity is the low-cost substitute for disappearance. Where an institution can suppress a stigmatising marker, the substrate need not be exited. Relevance For philosophy of identity, a structural alternative to psychological accounts of transformation, which separates cases that a phenomenological criterion cannot. For the sociology of religion, a way of assessing institutions that adjudicates no truth claims, examines no member’s mind, and does not treat severity of discipline as evidence of anything — offered with an explicit prohibition on ever applying it to a person. For institutional analysis, a worked demonstration that a documentary compliance measure is captured by the parties it measures, and what remains testable once that is conceded. Abstract A man enters the French Foreign Legion under a declared name. A bankrupt Japanese salaryman disappears overnight and lives unregistered in San’ya. A woman makes solemn profession and receives a name in religion. A man survives a near-fatal illness and reports that his values have permanently changed. Each is described in the same words: he became a different person. William James proposed in 1902 that these belong to one type, the twice-born, and the modern empirical literature on sudden personal transformation has largely retained that unification. This paper argues that they are four different operations, and that the difference is visible once a virtue-form is decomposed into three layers — a marker, a practice, and a source. Applying the decomposition to eleven cases of identity discontinuity yields two independent axes. The substrate may be left unchanged, transferred to a new holder, or exited entirely. The source may be left untouched, given, taken, or re-founded. Three results follow. The source can be given and cannot be taken: an external party that takes over an origination does not acquire it but destroys it, producing power with the discipline intact, so “taken” names an inversion rather than a transfer. The distinction between giving and taking is not psychological and not observable in individuals. A monastery and a high-control group may be identical in every layer except this one, which invites a criterion for assessing institutions that adjudicates no one’s truth claims and makes no judgement about how demanding a rule may be. The obvious form of that criterion does not work, and the paper’s own apparatus explains why. Source-protection provisions — a mandated formation period, a preserved right of departure, invalidity of consent obtained by force, fear or deceit — are both appropriable and displayable, so the Capture Law predicts that once they are used for adjudication they are operated by the organisations they were meant to assess. What survives is smaller: a one-sided test in which absence is informative and presence is not, and a behavioural test of whether such provisions have ever been exercised. The account must survive Eileen Barker’s rejection of coercive-persuasion theory, and §9 argues that it does, because her evidence concerns recruitment psychology and defection rates while the claim here concerns provisions in a document. Her finding that Unification Church members were free to leave and did leave is, on this account, the criterion’s primary evidence rather than an obstacle to it. The paper states its falsifier and has not run it.
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José Caetano de Mattos (2026) studied this question.
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