Theoretical framework demonstrates vulnerability in military decision production systems, indicating adversaries can disrupt organizational architectures without direct deception.
Military decision literature contains mature approaches to decision cycles, staff planning, mission command, command-and-control design, and adversarial influence. Yet these traditions often examine different segments of the decision problem. This working paper proposes Decision Architecture as a Battlespace (DAB), an integrated military-strategic framework that treats decision production itself as an operationally consequential architecture. The framework models the conversion of signals and information into executable strategic effect through eight linked functions: signal access, validation, interpretation, institutional transmission, authority alignment, option construction, temporal commitment, and execution conversion. Failure can occur at any function even when accurate information exists. DAB therefore distinguishes information possession from decision capacity and decision issuance from strategic effect, and conceptualizes adversarial action as capable of attacking decision-production functions rather than merely deceiving a decision maker. The paper specifies propositions, boundary conditions, and comparative distinctions from OODA, MDMP, Mission Command, Command and Control theory, and Reflexive Control. DAB is presented as a foundational research model requiring empirical testing rather than as a claim of terminological novelty.
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Osamah Almokdad (2026) studied this question.
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