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The purpose of the United Kingdom Transfusion Laboratory Collaborative (UKTLC) is to support transfusion laboratories by providing standards, guidance and direction ensuring a common management approach across the UK, as well as to monitor practices and provide feedback that can be used as national key performance indicators (KPI). The focus of the standards is to provide laboratories with a minimum level of standards, focusing on patient safety, key areas of practice and core skills for staff, upon which a robust quality management system (QMS) can be built. The standards are targeted at Blood Transfusion Consultant Leads, Pathology Directors, Blood Transfusion Laboratory Managers, Operational Managers and any other blood transfusion focused groups. The aim of the UKTLC was to set out minimum standards for laboratories that could be utilised across the UK. The first set of standards were published in 2009,1, 2 the standards were then revised and published in 2014.3 The collaborative has continued to ensure that the minimum standards remain suitable for the evolving landscape of laboratory practice. The UKTLC standards are intended to help minimise the risk of laboratory errors, through supporting and encouraging effective and appropriate education, training, competency and utilisation of staff, and the use of technology in hospital transfusion laboratories within the current UK legislative requirements for blood transfusion services. These standards will also help hospitals and organisations to ensure their members of staff achieve the standards of proficiency and practice set by The Health and Care Professions Council and as required by the UK Blood Safety and Quality Regulations (as amended)4 and ISO15189.5 Compliance with the UKTLC standards described below is accepted by both the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) as evidence to support their assessment/inspection programmes for laboratories. The UKTLC standards described in this document should be used in conjunction with guidance relating to transfusion laboratories at individual organisation level or within networked pathology services across the UK. Hospital blood transfusion laboratories operate under a regulated environment. The MHRA is responsible for the controls and authorisations that apply to hospital transfusion laboratories under the Blood Safety and Quality Regulations (BSQR) 2005 (as amended). The EU Commission and Council of Europe produced Good Practice Guidelines (GPG) for standards and specifications for implementing the quality system in blood establishments and hospital blood banks. In the UK, it is a legal requirement to report adverse reactions and events relating to blood transfusion to the MHRA and professionally mandated to report to Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT). Transfusion laboratory services are accredited to UKAS under ISO15189. Biomedical and Clinical Scientists working within transfusion laboratories must be registered with the Health and Care Professions Council. Support staff and those in training must be supervised by HCPC registered staff. Blood transfusion and related processes, if not properly controlled, have the potential to cause serious patient harm and death. The risks of harm due to adverse transfusion events also have a wider reach than that to the patient; there is also the potential of severe distress to the family, emotional and professional impact on the staff involved in the incident, a cultural impact on the department as a whole and reputational damage to the organisation. Data from the 2022 SHOT Annual report6 shows transfusion in the UK remains very safe, with a transfusion related risk of death of 1 in 63 537 and of serious harm of 1 in 15 450 components issued in the UK. Every year errors account for the majority of reports submitted to SHOT, in 2022 this figure amounted to 2908/3499 (83.1%), all of which were preventable. In 2022 laboratory errors accounted for 651/3499 (18.6%) SHOT reports. In 2020, 2 patient deaths were reported, possibly related to laboratory delays in provision of blood components. In 2021 & 2022 0 patient deaths were reported relating to laboratory errors. Many incidents reported to SHOT and MHRA, at first, appeared to result from failure to follow correct procedures. Further investigation often revealed a number of weaknesses in the QMS relating to processes, procedures, training and staffing levels. Processes need to be well planned and thought out. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) need to be simple, clear, easy to follow and explain the rationale for each step and take account for cognitive biases (mental short cuts to aid decision making). Training must be delivered to all staff expected to carry out these processes and staff must receive competency assessments, which are robust enough to ensure all aspects of the process are understood, including when to seek help. This will then ensure staff are more engaged and more likely to follow the SOP. Failure to investigate incidents thoroughly and identify system improvements could lead to staff being unfairly identified as responsible for the error occurring. This may inadvertently contribute to a “blame culture” leaving the potential for the error to recur or staff left feeling demoralised and demotivated in the workplace. The UK Transfusion Laboratory Culture survey (2019)7 noted that 37/94 (39.4%) of respondents observed a reluctance by joint haematology/transfusion staff to work in the transfusion department due to perceived additional pressures.7 Re-training should only be considered as a corrective and preventive action if it is indicated in the investigation, for example, if staff have forgotten or are unaware of the correct procedure. If they knew what they should have done, but did not perform the task correctly, then re-training is unlikely to prevent recurrence of the error. The importance of “near miss” reporting should not be understated, as these incidents provide valuable learning opportunities, even when the error is detected and rectified prior to the transfusion taking place. An incident captured as a near miss, where a patient is not harmed, may still have had the potential to cause harm under a different set of circumstances, and could therefore still be reportable to MHRA as a serious adverse event. Thorough investigation of these incidents can lead to valuable insight about the causes of error and lead to improvements to the QMS. These improvements will lead to increased patient safety. Transfusion laboratories must have a capacity plan in place to ensure adequate staff numbers and skill mix to provide a safe service (GPG 2.2.2). The UKTLC survey (2019) revealed that only 62% of laboratories had a capacity plan. For those that did have a capacity plan 28% stated that staffing levels did not fulfil the requirements of the plan and, on the day of the survey, 44% of respondents stated that staff numbers were below the requirement. The survey also noted that approximately 50% of laboratories were carrying vacancies, and that there was a high burden for staff training.7 It was also evident from serial SHOT Annual Reports that the laboratory errors related to misunderstanding or misuse of information technology (IT) systems continue to be reported.8 IT is an integral part of laboratory practice with the potential to reduce errors when configured and used correctly. The laboratory information management systems (LIMS) is the central repository of patient data, with interfaces to analyser systems and other related transfusion systems, such as electronic blood management and electronic patient record systems. Full details of transfusion IT systems procurement, implementation and management are covered by the British Society for Haematology guidelines.9 The UKTLC standards should be used in conjunction with the BSH guidelines and only provide critical criteria for transfusion IT. The UKTLC standards detailed in this report include minimum quality standard requirements for monitoring compliance with the standards, which can be used as a base line by organisations. A gap analysis tool is provided to allow organisations to identify areas where current practice does not meet the UKTLC standards, document actions required and provide assurance of continuous improvement to organisational management. The UK Transfusion Laboratory Collaborative membership is: Institute of Biomedical Science (IBMS), British Blood Transfusion Society (BBTS), the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Royal College of Pathologists (RCPath), Serous Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT), United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS), United Kingdom National External Quality Assessment Service (UKNEQAS) and the NHS England National Blood Transfusion Committee (NHSE NBTC) and their equivalents in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The safety culture in any team or organisation is an important component of supporting safety and quality improvements. Safety culture is the way patient safety is perceived, valued and prioritised in an organisation or department. It is indicative of the commitment to safety at all levels in an organisation or department and can be described as “how things are done around here”, particularly when no external scrutiny is leveraged. The laboratory safety culture is determined by a combination of organisational and local team cultures. Reporting patient safety incidents and an open communication culture that supports incident reporting is a critical element in upholding health and safety in the workplace. This needs a workplace culture that supports reporting, deal with people in a ‘just’ way, acknowledging that through learning from reported incidents, system changes can be implemented to improve patient safety. Safety culture influences safety outcomes and measuring a baseline identifies areas for improvement, identifies strengths and allows monitoring of changes/trends over time. Simply measuring or diagnosing safety culture can also raise staff awareness about patient safety. Measuring safety culture allows evaluation of the cultural impact of patient safety initiatives and interventions and facilitates internal and external benchmarking. Appropriate laboratory staffing levels must be in place to ensure the safe and effective delivery of all transfusion service activities and be subject to regular review, risk assessment and agreement through local governance structures. Staffing level assessment should include consideration of the laboratory practical workload, training requirements and QMS activities. This must be achieved using a capacity plan. A regularly reviewed capacity plan must be in place covering the numbers and skill mix required to provide a safe service. The capacity plan must include all aspects of the service, including supervision, training and the QMS. The capacity plan must consider capacity for training posts and the ability to provide training. The capacity plan should include reference to longer term laboratory plans and service growth. Where this is not possible the capacity plan must be reviewed as part of any project which will affect laboratory workload and associated activities. It is expected that all of the requirements of a QMS (BSQRSI50/2005) and ISO15189 are included in capacity planning as part of the workload and service delivery. There must be an adequate number of staff (as defined within the laboratories capacity plan) with specialist transfusion knowledge (see standard 2.1) and skills to provide supervision over the transfusion service. These specialists must have protected time agreed enabling them to provide the QMS elements of the workload, service improvement projects and to maintain specialist knowledge, competence and CPD. Rationale: SHOT reports and UKTLC surveys have repeatedly identified unsafe practice related to inadequate staffing levels. Laboratories report challenges with BMS recruitment and retention at all levels and issues recruiting experienced staff. High staff turnover rates and recruitment of inexperienced staff place additional burden of training on the existing staff pool and impact on staff morale and absence rates. Regular review of the staffing levels by laboratory management enables identification of issues with staff numbers. Incorporating this into risk assessments and review through local governance structures highlights the risks to senior hospital management, facilitating staffing review. Capacity planning supports identification and agreement of minimum staff requirement, enables regular review of compliance, and identifies areas where action needs to be taken. SHOT have developed capacity plan guidance in conjunction with the UKTLC. This document should be used in conjunction with local process and can help provide a guide for developing a capacity plan, which is line with UKTLC standards. Evidence: SHOT report 2020 UKTLC survey 2019 UKTLC survey 2022 Agenda for change (AfC) NHS terms and conditions10 SHOT/UKTLC capacity plan Quality measures All transfusion laboratories must have in place: Capacity plan and evidence of regular review. Risk assessment that includes impact of staffing levels and contingency plan if staffing levels drop below minimum. Evidence that staffing levels and risk assessment are agreed and reviewed at governance level Note: All training & competency laboratory plans must meet the requirements of the Good Practice Guide and UKAS accreditation requirements. Rationale: The UKTLC survey (2019) revealed that staffing levels remained an area for concern, with high levels of inexperienced staff requiring training, inadequate levels of advanced specialist staff for supervisory activity and increasing vacancies.7 Inadequate transfusion knowledge and lack of supervision can lead to error, cases reported to SHOT8 demonstrate the influence that laboratory decision making can have on patient care. A total of 102/439 (23.2%) SHOT reports in 2020 received involved a member of staff who was lone working. Laboratories should have a culture where staff feel safe to raise concerns if they do not have sufficient training, knowledge, and skills to be working alone or if the workload becomes unmanageable. Staff should never be allowed to work alone until they have passed a robust competency assessment. The 2019 Annual SHOT Report suggested an UPTAKE model for competency-assessment, which remains a pertinent tool.12 Evidence: UKTLC survey 2019 UKTLC survey 2022 SHOT report 2020 SHOT report 2019 Quality standards: Laboratory management must have evidence that all staff working in, or for, the transfusion laboratory have: The appropriate qualifications for their role The appropriate training for their role Regular competency assessment for their role Recorded participation in CPD activities, if appropriate Rationale IT plays an integral role in the provision of a safe transfusion service within the laboratory setting. IT systems can prevent errors if configured, implemented and use correctly. In 2020 there were 474 errors, and 25 near miss events reported relating to IT.8 SHOT formed the SHOT UK Collaborative Reviewing and Reforming IT Processes in Transfusion (SCRIPT) group, comprising of the laboratory and IT SHOT working expert group members, to begin a constructive dialogue between transfusion departments and IT providers, as well as identifying the support required by transfusion experts to harness the opportunity of IT systems to improve patient safety. A survey distributed by SCRIPT noted deficiencies in upgrades to laboratory information systems (LIMS) due to financial or time constraints, leading to missed opportunities for safety improvements. The survey also noted that despite the clear evidence for patient safety provided by electronic blood management systems (EBMS), 43% of respondents have not implemented a system. The majority of those that had implemented EBMS included blood refrigerator controls, but less than 30% had full vein-to-vein functionality. Interoperability between IT systems has been noted as contributory to error,8 systems are now available providing electronic transfer of laboratory results, which should be utilised wherever possible. Errors were also noted during IT downtime periods. In the 2020 Annual SHOT report The largest cause of cold chain errors identified was refrigerator/equipment failure 33/68 (48.5%) of which 5 involved failures of temperature monitoring processes. Cases included described situations where there was a lack of robust process for escalation of alarms, and systems, which relied on emails and messages left on answering machines. Laboratory management must ensure that reliable communication channels are always available. The laboratory must also have a robust process in place, for staff, so that alerts are picked up as soon as possible and must include clear guidance of what, when and how to escalate. Evidence: SHOT report 2020 BSH guidelines for IT Quality standards: Systems for electronic transfer of patient results between IT systems must be implemented wherever possible. Risk assessments must include details of mitigating actions where interfaces are not in place. Reporting to SHOT includes a human factors question set designed to understand how investigations apportion culpability across the different aspects of the system (staff member, environment, organisation and government/regulatory). In 2020, as in previous years, there was considerable variability in whether scores are assigned to all four factors and nearly a third were only given a score for one factor (780/2623, 29.8%) Of these, the vast majority are allocated a single score for the culpability of staff members (745/780, 95.5%).8 The SHOT report 20208 stated that incident investigation should always include consideration of the impact of human factors. There may not necessarily be a single root cause, many incidents are multifactorial. Identification of all factors contributing to the error will enable robust interventions to be implemented for each of the factors highlighted. Local investigators should have appropriate training in the investigation process, which should include the importance of human factors. The Good Practice guide (GPG,16) clearly states that where human error is suspected care should be exercised to ensure that process, procedural and system-based errors have not been overlooked. A white paper published by the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors17 aimed to help organisations understand a human factors approach to investigating and learning from adverse events. It is also widely recognised that with healthcare systems being complex, a ‘systems thinking’ approach to improvement must be adopted as it may improve the ability to understand current work processes, predict system behaviour and design modifications to improve related functioning. ‘Systems thinking’ involves exploring the characteristics of components within a system (e.g., work tasks and technology) and how they interconnect to improve understanding of how outcomes emerge from these interactions. It has been proposed that this approach is necessary when investigating incidents where harm has, or could have, occurred and when designing improvement interventions.8 Evidence: SHOT Report 2020 CHIEF 2020 SEIPS Quality standards: There is a recognised and documented process for reporting adverse events, near miss events, potential risks, and examples of excellence and. There is evidence that staff are encouraged to report, and reports are reviewed regularly for trends by management. There is a recognised and documented process for submission of staff suggestions for improvement, with management review and feedback. Review of incident investigation reports shows emphasis on the system aspects rather than individual blame (GPG17). Staff suspension from duty is applied appropriately and only when all system aspects have been excluded. The UKTLC standards have been written in accordance with the requirements of the the Good Practice standards of accreditation for laboratories The UKTLC standards are designed to and minimise factors contributing to laboratory process failure in the of patient The impact of the UKTLC standards on the and of laboratory incidents will be by the MHRA & SHOT reporting the MHRA Serious Blood and reporting system and by surveys by the UKTLC. The MHRA & UK Accreditation Service can use the UKTLC standards during the process and can to evidence for The UKTLC also to all other members of the Transfusion and the previous UKTLC who have to the of these standards. The no of The qualifications below in and are current at the time of of these standards but may be subject to in the are encouraged to for any using the details on the of this In to HCPC professional in Transfusion accredited with a of at in Biomedical Science in conjunction with an in Transfusion Science or a Transfusion Science to Evidence of level learning to with at in Transfusion of the Institute of Biomedical Science by in blood transfusion or transfusion In to HCPC professional in Transfusion Science in Haematology with Hospital Transfusion in Transfusion
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