A Constructive Condorcet Jury Theorem

There is a well-established research program that relies on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) to justify democracy and majority voting from an epistemic perspective. This paper explores how the CJT can be extended beyond its standard epistemic interpretation. I propose a version of the CJT that does not presuppose the existence of an objective fact of the matter (or moral fact) on which group members must vote; I call it the “Constructive CJT.” This constructive version of the CJT is designed to show that a close relative of majority voting (here modeled as majority polling followed by individual action) can help bring about outcomes that are desirable independently of the procedure itself. In particular, it helps agents build situations in which cooperative behavior is achieved, as long as certain conditions are met. This provides a middle ground between epistemic and procedural justifications; under certain conditions, majority voting contributes to generating the environment under which desirable outcomes arise.