Reconsidering the role of preparation in perception-action coupling: a critical response to the preparation-perception-action framework

This article critically evaluates Bobrownicki et al.’s (2026) proposal to extend perception-action (P-A) coupling through a preparation-perception-action (P-P-A) framework informed partly by predictive processing. The importance of preparation in sport is not disputed. From an ecological perspective, planning, rehearsal, and anticipation can be understood as part of the multiscale organisation of performer-environment relations through attunement, calibration, intention, and sensitivity to affordances. On this basis, the paper examines whether treating preparation as a distinct stage adds explanatory value beyond existing ecological accounts. It argues that the P-P-A proposal rests on an asymmetrical evidential standard, treats methodological priorities as limitations of theoretical scope, and separates preparation from P-A processes without specifying a distinct mechanism. An applied illustration from tennis shows how anticipation and preparation can remain embedded within P-A coupling. Overall, P-P-A does not clearly specify novel mechanisms, generate distinct empirical predictions, or resolve identified limitations in ecological accounts.