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The advent of novel assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) has considerably expanded our sphere of control over our reproduction, and consequently, the scope of ethical debate surrounding reproductive choice.The now widespread availability of fertility services and genetic selection, in particular, raises questions regarding what free reproductive choice does and should entail.Whilst a negative form of the right to reproductive choice affords individuals only the right to non-interference from third parties in their reproductive decision-making, a positive moral right demands that its exercisability is ensured-that is, governments have a responsibility to offer support for individuals for whom reproductive choice is limited without additional aid.Here, I propose a new form of a positive moral right, which I argue can also effectively guide policy surrounding access to ARTs for fertility and genetic selection.not only to the decision whether to have children and how many to have, but what type of children to have.Traditionally, reproductive choice has been grounded on negative liberty, entitling right-bearers simply the right to non-interference in one's reproductive decision-making by third parties.A basis of positive liberty, however, goes further: it demands that third parties facilitate individuals' exercising the freedom to choose.This facilitation requirement underpins the provision of (early) abortion in 71% of high-income countries (World Population Policies 2013 2013).However, when it comes to accessing ARTs such as PGD, the negative right conception continues to dominate, and has led to a widening gap between those who can exercise their right to make reproductive choices, and those who are unable to exercise the right, for example due to structural economic and social disadvantage that prevents them from being independently able to access or pay for these technologies.If reproductive choice (including access to ARTs) should be extended to all individuals, then the negative conception is inadequate.The sufficiency of a negative right to reproductive choice (concerning ARTs) has been challenged before, yet feasible conceptions of an alternative, positive right have received far less attention.Here, I present a novel argument for the positive moral right to reproductive choice, entailing the provision of accessible reproductive technologies by governments for those who cannot access or use them without additional support.Applying the capabilities approach in this area, I take the position that the positive moral right to reproductive liberty (PMRRL) is justified by the centrality of reproductive choice to human flourishing and self-determination.This has implications both for reproductive choices to have a child, and for reproductive choices concerning what type of child to have.To introduce the argument, I use John Robertson's Children of Choice (1994)-advocating a negative right to reproductive choice-as a springboard to critique some key aspects of a negative moral right, in the first section.This insufficiency of the negative right is elaborated upon more generally in the second section, where I also explore how a positive moral right
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