A Provably Secure Lightweight Three-Factor 5G-AKA Authentication Protocol Relying on an Extendable Output Function

Compared to 4G, the designed authentication and key agreement protocol for 5G communication (5G-AKA) offers better security. State-of-the-art shows that various protocols indicate the flaws in the 5G-AKA and suggest solutions primarily for the desynchronization attack, traceability attack, and perfect forward secrecy. However, most authentication protocols fail to facilitate the device stolen attack and are expensive; they also do not consider the prominent security issues such as post-compromise security and non-repudiation. Considering the above demerits of these protocols and the necessity to offer additional security, a provably secure lightweight 5G-AKA multi-factor authentication protocol relying on an extendable output function is proposed. The security of the proposed work has been confirmed informally and formally (ROR logic, GNY logic, and Scyther tool) to ensure that the proposed work handles all types of attacks and offers additional security features, such as post-compromise features and non-repudiation. Furthermore, we compute the performance of the proposed work and compare it with its counterparts to show that our work is less costly and more suitable for lightweight devices than others in terms of computational, communication, storage, and energy consumption cost.