Philosophical Buddhism and fundamental reality: a reply to McNabb and Baldwin

Tyler McNabb and Erik Baldwin argue that (among other Asian traditions) Buddhism is logically consistent with the existence of a fundamental being of the sort in classical theism. They further contend that the Jonang-Zhentong (Shentong) and Jodo Shinshu (Shin) Buddhist traditions endorse that there really is (at least something like) such a fundamental reality. This article is a friendly reply to McNabb and Baldwin. I explicate two issues for their argument—one from a general lack of engagement with Buddhist dialetheic-paraconsistent perspectives, and another from a potential internal inconsistency in their view of fundamental reality. Ultimately, I draw on advancements in contemporary metaontology and higher-order logics to provide helpful resolutions. We begin by considering a concise summary of their argument (section 1). Afterwards, the earlier issues are explicated, and the subsequent outlined resolutions given (section 2). Finally, a central concern is engaged (section 3).