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Theoretical analysis uncovers revenue shifts and manipulation limits under artist-centric royalty models, indicating reduced effective fraud but unchanged social costs.
Artist-centric royalties weight announced play categories before a fixed pool is divided. This common-cell restriction limits arbitrary recording-specific ex-post allocations. We derive recording and owner incidence, redistribution bounds, and category-weight effects. With imperfect screening, a lower retained weight weakly reduces effective artificial claims in partial equilibrium, but not necessarily attempts or social cost. An unrestricted user-indexed representation nests user-centric payment; the common-cell artist-centric class generally does not. These are same-stream counterfactuals, not welfare or adoption claims.
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Bae et al. (2026) studied this question.
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