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Using data on undisclosed SEC investigations, this study distinguishes between the SEC’s decision of select investigative targets ( investigation decision ) and its decision to pursue enforcement actions against those firms ( enforcement decision ). Then, it investigates how corporate lobbying relates to the different stages of the SEC enforcement process. First, this study finds that firms habitually engaged in lobbying activities are more likely to be investigated by the SEC. The association is pronounced for firms that lobby directly with the SEC. However, firms that increase lobbying expenditures, especially toward SEC-relevant committees in Congress, during an ongoing investigation are less likely to face enforcement actions. Further analysis suggests that the SEC is more likely to open investigations against lobbying firms during periods of resource constraints. Overall, the findings have implications for understanding resource allocation and regulatory dynamics within SEC enforcement.
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Daeun Lee (2025) studied this question.
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