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Global incident analysis uncovers diverse vehicle types and non-ideological perpetrators in vehicle-ramming attacks, highlighting the need for adaptive counter-terrorism defense.
Vehicle-as-a-Weapon (VaaW) attacks have emerged as a persistent tactic in terrorism and political violence, exploiting the accessibility of everyday vehicles and the permeability of public space. Drawing on a global dataset of 121 incidents (2010–2024), this article challenges prevailing assumptions that such attacks are primarily conducted with heavy trucks by ideologically motivated extremists. Results show that a substantial proportion of incidents involved lighter vehicles, and that non-ideological lone actors were responsible for a substantial share of attacks operationally indistinguishable from terrorism cases. The 2016–2017 surge in VaaW incidents corresponded with explicit jihadi propaganda (Inspire, Rumiyah) and media amplification of the Nice attack, underscoring the role of tactical diffusion in terrorist learning. Analysis of barrier encounters reveals that fatalities were substantially higher when barriers were breached, though selection effects caution against simplistic conclusions. The study argues for a shift in counter-terrorism protection, away from exclusive reliance on static, heavy-vehicle mitigation and towards layered, adaptive CT strategies. By situating VaaW within the broader literature on lone-actor terrorism, tactical diffusion, and CT legitimacy, this article contributes both empirical evidence and policy guidance for counter-terrorism practitioners and scholars of political violence.
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Ludbey et al. (2026) studied this question.
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