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Philosophical analysis demonstrates non-justificatory warrant for axioms in set theory, suggesting foundational mathematical rationality operates without traditional reasons.
This article is concerned with the question: What makes it rational to believe a mathematical statement? It focuses in particular on philosophical questions concerning rationally believing set theoretic axioms. A distinction is drawn between having mathematical warrant and having philosophical warrant for believing mathematical axioms. I argue that mathematical warrant for believing set theoretic axioms does not consist in having a complex of reasons that constitutes a justification for believing these axioms. “Die Religion befiehlt, Annahmen zu machen (Du sollst glauben), die natürliche Vernunft ebenfalls … … ” [10, p. 69]
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Leon Horsten (2026) studied this question.
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