What question did this study set out to answer?

To assess how participatory, inclusive, and representative constitutional drafting processes affect the theoretical probability of successful constitutional adoption.

August 22, 2026Public ChoiceOpen Access

Constitutional drafting processes and constitutional success

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Authors

ACAdam ChiltonChicago Kent College of Law MMMurat C. MunganMitchell Institute MVMila VersteegUniversity of Virginia

Discussion

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Overview

Theoretical analysis reveals that inclusive constitutional drafting reduces adoption probabilities through excessive protection demands, highlighting the risks of broad representation.

Key Points

To assess how participatory, inclusive, and representative constitutional drafting processes affect the theoretical probability of successful constitutional adoption.
Formulated a strategic Constitution Drafting game (CD game) where representatives from diverse interest groups negotiate constitutional issue protections.
Analyzed equilibrium dynamics using single-peaked success probability functions and properties of nice aggregative games across varying numbers of representative groups.
Representative drafting incentives lead to cumulative issue protection choices that systematically exceed the optimal level required to maximize adoption odds.
Maximum and minimum equilibrium probabilities of constitutional success consistently decrease as the number of participating interest group representatives grows.
Optimism regarding ratification prospects compounds individual protection demands, driving success probabilities even lower.

Cite This Study

Chilton et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6aa67de39feada129378ef6b https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-01447-w

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August 22, 2026Public ChoiceOpen Access

Constitutional drafting processes and constitutional success

View Full Paper

Ask AI

Bookmark

Authors

ACAdam ChiltonChicago Kent College of Law MMMurat C. MunganMitchell Institute MVMila VersteegUniversity of Virginia

Discussion

Member takes

Overview

Theoretical analysis reveals that inclusive constitutional drafting reduces adoption probabilities through excessive protection demands, highlighting the risks of broad representation.

Key Points

To assess how participatory, inclusive, and representative constitutional drafting processes affect the theoretical probability of successful constitutional adoption.
Formulated a strategic Constitution Drafting game (CD game) where representatives from diverse interest groups negotiate constitutional issue protections.
Analyzed equilibrium dynamics using single-peaked success probability functions and properties of nice aggregative games across varying numbers of representative groups.
Representative drafting incentives lead to cumulative issue protection choices that systematically exceed the optimal level required to maximize adoption odds.
Maximum and minimum equilibrium probabilities of constitutional success consistently decrease as the number of participating interest group representatives grows.
Optimism regarding ratification prospects compounds individual protection demands, driving success probabilities even lower.

Cite This Study

Chilton et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6aa67de39feada129378ef6b https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-01447-w

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