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In the sixth (2012) edition of its ethics manual, the American College of Physicians states “physicians, patient advocates, insurers, and payers should participate together in decisions at the policy level … and should base allocations on medical need, efficacy, cost-effectiveness, and proper distribution of benefits and burdens in society.”1 In its approach to funding the introduction of prion filters for red blood cell (RBC) transfusions in Ireland, the Irish government attempted to do just that.2 As an approach to blood safety initiatives within a country it was not a first; however, the context within Ireland in which this effort was conducted was unique. First, there had been damning and very public tribunals of inquiry into the great blood-borne infections of the 1980s. Criminal charges had afterward been laid against some of the staff of the national blood transfusion service. Next, there was a high relative risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) infections in the country—second only to the United Kingdom and higher than in France. In response the blood transfusion service had been an early adopter of potential protective measures, often to a higher degree than other nations—universal use of recombinant Factor (F)VIII and F IX, universal leukoreduction, extensive donor deferrals, importing plasma for clinical use from outside Europe, and replacing cryoprecipitate with fibrinogen concentrate.3 Finally, this setting was coupled with the profound economic collapse in the country after 2008, the scale at least of which was due in part to the incompetence, insouciance, and hubris of individuals in public office. In this edition of TRANSFUSION, Teljeur and colleagues4 describe the health economic analysis within that process of policy-making: a detailed and careful analysis of the risk and the costs and the expected benefits. This analysis boils down to a best estimate that the most probable scenario is that two people (with a 95% confidence interval [CI] of zero to eight people) will die in Ireland from transfusion-transmitted vCJD in the next 10 years, people who otherwise would not have died had the filters been introduced. (This assumes that the filters in question are effective in preventing transfusion transmissions in humans.) In the meantime €68.2 million (approx. $85.7 million USD at end-August 2012 exchange rates) would have been diverted to other health care uses, or toward repaying the national debt, instead of being spent on prion filters. It is difficult to imagine a plainer statement of the results, and the clarity of the outcome reflects the clarity and openness of the process. Of course, Teljeur and colleagues do not make health policy—they simply inform the policy-makers, and although for the previous 12 years of the known vCJD threat period the blood transfusion service itself had done much of the policy making and implementation, it is ultimately the government who pays, using the people's money. In this instance, it was the Minister for Health, himself a physician, who took explicit responsibility for the final policy of not implementing prion filters, at least for the time being. The money to save those zero to eight statistical lives may well be better spent saving many more lives: it is not difficult to see how much better value could be obtained for the health care Euro. Nevertheless, there are problems with this approach to applying health economics to blood transfusion safety. In the first instance it is inconsistent with current practices and public perceptions; the allocated cost is arbitrary, and may not reflect the public consensus of values that it implies, and that perhaps it once could claim.4 Second, it is more or less ineffective in achieving its goal of increasing blood safety in the face of emerging infectious threats—by the time it can be deployed, it is far too late to do very much good.5 If we were to apply the same logic and the same arithmetic as Teljeur and coworkers have used for prion filtration to infectious disease testing, we would certainly abandon testing for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and hepatitis B virus (HBV) by nucleic acid testing (NAT), and perhaps even by serology, perhaps replacing it with a sentinel system in the general population that continuously updated the risk and the costs. The level of HIV in blood donors is very low in Ireland, and there would be approximately one infection or less per year for the 32,000 people transfused; the infected person would quite likely die before the disease became manifest and anyway could now be treated with antiviral therapy. Similar considerations apply to HCV and HBV. Millions of Euros would be saved. Stopping syphilis and human T-lymphotropic virus Types I and II testing would be more logical still, and perhaps we should pare back the staff training and the very expensive GMP approach. Public perception, however, and by implication willingness to pay, the holy grail of health economics and “the proper value of the risk reduction benefits for government policy,”6 sets different values on public safety (including blood safety) than on drug costs, and so currently we are readily reimbursed for these processes. Teljeur and colleagues use a cost utility analysis. This approach defines the cost of a process or intervention and measures the benefits according to explicit rules. While the approach is widely used, the logic in applying it to blood transfusion safety can be challenged. In the first instance the tool was developed and calibrated for quite a different purpose—to apply costs to more or less quantifiable outcomes, that is, with a measurable degree of certainty. Thus, if I give Drug X to 10,000 patients I can infer from published studies that Benefits Y will accrue. I can monetize the Benefits Y according to explicit rules and decide that Drug X represents affordable value, or not, again against a predefined standard. The validity of making the leap to using a tool for measuring the value of an intervention of quantified utility to using it for measuring the value of an intervention of unquantifed and very much estimated value is moot. The inescapable fact that something needs to be done, that we simply cannot spend money without some attempt at “proper distribution of benefits and burdens in society,”1 does not mean that we can use nonvalidated tools in the process without acknowledging their limitations. There has also been a downward drift in the cost of human life in the eyes of health payers, as Teljeur and colleagues note, and which seems to lack the transparency that set the notional values of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) in the 1990s.7, 8 Tens of thousands of dollars have been removed from the value of a QALY over the years by a process that seems to lack full accountability and wide consultation. But if, as the authors acknowledge, prevention of infection from blood transfusion is management of a civil risk, rather than prevention of a medical complication or treatment of a disease, then the cost considerations may be quite different. In the United Kingdom, road safety initiatives are considered to give value for money at around £1.2M per life saved (in 2012 British pounds, calculated from Viscusi and Aldy6; $1.84M at the August 2012 exchange rate); in the United States the acceptable price per statistical life saved is derived from observations of wage/fatality risk tradeoffs and is considerably more, at $5 to $10M (2012 USD8, 9) depending on which agency is involved: the FDA's 1996 Medical Devices cGMP rule costed at $5.5M 1996 ($7.32M 2012) per statistical life saved toward the lower end and the EPA at the higher end of the range.6 An international study across a limited range of countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, but not Ireland, yielded a median figure of $7M ($8.72M in 2012 USD) as the value of a statistical life.6 In this setting, the costs estimated by Teljeur and coworkers for saving up to eight lives over 10 years (€68.2M total discounted cost, or €8.5M per life saved—$10.7M at the end-August 2012 exchange rate) still exceed the present accepted range of values. However, they are much closer to a general level of acceptability when the comparison is made against the value of statistical life, and death, in the United States and internationally, than when using an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio. Given that eight lives is the upper end of the 95% CI around the median, that no life lost from not introducing prion filtration is more likely, that two lives lost or gained is the most likely outcome, and that no attempt is made here at discounting for age of the statistical lives saved, then prion filtration is justifiably deferred on current knowledge, whereas NAT and other blood safety initiatives look more like justifiable choices. Notwithstanding misgivings about the inconsistencies thrown up by using cost utility or cost-effectiveness analyses for blood safety initiatives, or by the application of instruments for monetizing health gains to purposes for which they were not designed, and by the necessity of accepting wide error margins in making estimates on which to base the calculations, Teljeur and colleagues have set a high standard for health economic evaluations of future blood transfusion safety initiatives. Unfortunately, by the time enough information can be gathered to evaluate a safety intervention in these terms, or even in value-of-statistical-life terms, for blood for transfusion, the benefits of the intervention will have been almost completely lost.3 Introducing prion filters now might save a few lives, and if the epidemic had been different might have saved many more, but almost all the tens of thousands of patients who would have been infected by a more efficient prion would have been infected by 1996, when the human disease first became apparent. Almost all donors in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and France who were going to become infectious were already infectious by then—the mad cow horse had well and truly bolted. Only poor transmissibility of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) to humans by the oral route prevented a major transfusion-related component to a much larger vCJD disaster: just luck, no skill involved. Even leukoreduction, which might have been effective, at least in part, was not recognized as justifiable at that time.10 Nevertheless there were a limited number of precautionary policies that could have been (and in some places were) adopted either in advance or at a very early stage in the evolution of vCJD, that might have reduced the transmission of vCJD by blood transfusion, and for very little cost. These policies could also be effective in controlling other transfusion-transmissible diseases both current and yet to emerge. Optimal use of blood11 was and remains an effective measure to limit the spread through blood transfusion of vCJD and other emerging infections. Restricting transfusion of blood products to patients with clear indications for benefit will help attenuate the impact of any new, unknowable, unquantifiable infectious risk from transfusion. At an individual patient level the risk is always proportional to the number of donor exposures. Countries with an overall RBC transfusion rate of more than around 30 units per 1000 population (excluding large programs for thalassemia and sickle cell disease) are exposing their citizens to risks that may not be justified. In addition, excluding donors by reason of prior residence in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe, or on the basis of having received a blood transfusion in the United Kingdom, was a relatively simple and cheap strategy that was deployed early in a number of countries. As things turned out, the effect of these strategies on transfusion safety was probably very small; nevertheless, in the face of the considerable uncertainties at the time they still seem to have been appropriate. Within the high-risk countries of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and France restrictions based on travel were either impossible or of limited benefit. In 1997 the French national blood transfusion service banned people who had previously been transfused from donating blood—the Irish and others followed suit later.2 For transfusion-transmissible diseases with long incubation periods that are actively spreading in a community through predominantly nontransfusion routes, this approach may add little to transfusion safety.12 In the setting of BSE and vCJD, however, where the primary source of the infection was effectively removed during the latter part of the 1990s, blood transfusion became a reservoir for continuing transmission in the countries with the highest vCJD exposure, so that preventing transfusion recipients from donating blood was an effective risk reduction step.13 It could also be argued that for any transfusion-transmissible disease not otherwise prevalent in the sector of society that donates blood altruistically, as observed for non-A non-B hepatitis in the United States before the era of HCV testing,12 prior blood transfusion in donors is a significant risk factor for unrecognized transmission. Blood transfusion infections, by their well-known history and public response in the past, by their inherent unpredictability, by their potential for great societal harm, and by the fact that by the time we can do anything specific to offset that harm it is too late to avert much of the damage, behave more as civil risks rather than as medical complications of treatment or disease. Teljeur and colleagues note that approximately 32,000 people get transfused in Ireland per year. Even with one of the lowest annual rates of transfusion in the developed world (for one of the youngest populations), this represents 1 in every 140 of the population of Ireland being exposed to blood transfusion every year, and while most transfusions are in older patients, those exposed include infants, children, and pregnant women. The demographic of blood transfusion places its contamination on a par with similar public health and regulatory concerns, such as food- and water-borne infections and epidemics. The response of policy-makers, blood providers, and blood prescribers to the threat of emerging contaminants may not always reflect that understanding. The author states that he has no conflict of interest to declare.
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William G. Murphy (2012) studied this question.
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