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We consider weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 1 . For these games, we investigate the existence and efficiency of approximate pure Nash equilibria which are obtained through sequences of unilateral improvement moves by the players. By exploiting a simple technique, we firstly show that these games admit an infinite set of d -approximate potential functions. This implies that there always exists a d -approximate pure Nash equilibrium which can be reached through any sequence of d -approximate improvement moves by the players. As a corollary, we also obtain that, under mild assumptions on the structure of the players' strategies, these games also admit a constant approximate potential function. Secondly, using a simple potential function argument, we are able to show that a ( d + δ ) -approximate pure Nash equilibrium of cost at most ( d + 1 ) / ( d + δ ) times the cost of an optimal state always exists, for every δ ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] .
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Caragiannis et al. (2020) studied this question.
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