Paying for protection: Everyday negotiations with bandits in rural Zamfara, Northwest Nigeria

In rural Zamfara, Nigeria, peace has become a commodified product, secured through coercive bargaining with armed groups rather than guaranteed by the state. Since the escalation of armed banditry in 2011, farming communities have increasingly relied on protection payments and informal negotiations to gain access to farmland, sustain livelihoods, and reduce exposure to violence. Drawing on Everyday Negotiation Theory (ENT), this article conceptualises these interactions as routine bargaining practices through which civilians navigate power asymmetries under conditions of chronic insecurity. Using a qualitative case study based on triangulated evidence from open-source security reports, policy documents, peer-reviewed scholarship, and localised conflict narratives, the article interrogates how the All-Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN) negotiates with armed bandit groups to secure access to farmland, mobility, and protection for farming communities in rural Zamfara. The findings demonstrate that while these arrangements provide short-term security and enable agricultural production, they simultaneously legitimize armed actors, institutionalise shadow governance, and reinforce the political economy of violence. Rather than reflecting voluntary cooperation, such negotiations represent constrained strategies of survival in contexts of institutional abandonment. The article contributes to debates on everyday negotiation, rural resilience, and informal governance, demonstrating the long-term governance consequences of coercive, and transactional security arrangements in a rural African context.