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Policy analysis reveals layered overlaps and regulatory gaps across European Union space cybersecurity frameworks, highlighting contested sectoral boundaries.
The “Space 4.0” transition—a crowded, commercialised and contested orbital environment populated by new spacefaring nations and private operators—has made the cybersecurity of space infrastructure a governance problem rather than a technical one. In the European Union it is addressed by three instruments with different logics. Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) is a horizontal cybersecurity regime that lists “space” among its critical sectors but confines its reach to ground-based operators. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (CER) governs the physical resilience of critical entities, including the same infrastructure. The proposed EU Space Act (COM(2025) 335 final) adds a tailored all-hazard regime spanning the space, ground and link segments. We show that the Space Act does not displace NIS2 as a generic lex specialis : Article 75(1) designates it a “sector-specific Union legal act” only as regards Article 21 NIS2, invoking solely the risk-management limb of the Article 4 NIS2 equivalence gateway, so that the reporting obligations of Article 23 continue to apply in full—a reading recital 87 states expressly. Article 82(1) adds a second equivalence threshold, referenced to Article 13 CER and entered through the parallel gateway of Article 1(3) CER, which, unlike Article 4 NIS2, conditions displacement on recognition by Member States. The resulting design is trilateral, layered rather than substitutive, and asymmetric between its limbs. We then map 35 space-system risks against each instrument, reporting full and partial coverage separately and documenting the provision relied on for every cell. Eight risks (22.9%) fall outside all three instruments, a strict subset of the eleven outside NIS2; the difference of three is what Annex VII of the Space Act adds over both horizontal instruments at the edge of the risk space. Finally, we track what the co-legislators have done to it: the Council replacing bounded speciality with parallel application, the rapporteur proposing integration into NIS2. Both trajectories support one conclusion. Sectoral speciality in Union cybersecurity law is worth precisely what the equivalence gateway the sectoral act invokes, and where the boundaries it draws are left to be inferred from a cross-reference, the legislature tends to remove them.
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Carlos Galán Cordero (2026) studied this question.
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