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Evolutionary game simulation reveals key stability conditions for mobile phone recycling networks, indicating that balanced pricing and targeted subsidies prevent opportunism.
As urban mining plays an increasingly important role in resource security and sustainable development, insufficient coordination among reverse supply chain participants has become a major constraint on the efficient recovery of urban mineral resources. From the perspective of interfirm cooperative innovation, this study takes waste mobile phones as an application context and develops a four-party evolutionary game model involving the government, recyclers, remanufacturers, and consumers. The model incorporates opportunistic behavior in cooperative innovation, government subsidy intensity, and product pricing into a unified analytical framework. Replicator dynamics, Jacobian-based stability analysis, and numerical simulations are employed to examine the evolutionary mechanisms and stability conditions of multi-actor collaborative governance. The results identify four stable equilibrium configurations and show that: (1) excessive innovation spillovers and asymmetric interdependence between recyclers and remanufacturers may weaken incentive compatibility and induce opportunistic behavior; (2) the effects of government subsidies vary across evolutionary stages and depend on the strategic responses of other actors; and (3) interfirm transfer prices and final market prices promote stable cooperation only within specific ranges. These findings provide a theoretical basis and policy implications for improving collaborative governance in reverse supply chains for urban mineral resource recovery and supporting sustainable urban mining.
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Cai et al. (2026) studied this question.
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