The Reiwa Rice Crisis in Japan: Collection-Price Competition and the Price-Formation Role of JA

This paper examines the Reiwa Rice Crisis in Japan as a problem of rice price formation and collection competition rather than a simple shortage of physical rice. The analysis focuses on the role of JA (Japan Agricultural Cooperatives) and its preliminary payments (gaisan-kin) in the rice collection market. It argues that the JA-centered collection-price mechanism became a major causal driver of the rapid rise in rice prices. Higher producer-facing prices intensified competition among JA and non-JA collectors, altered the traditional flow of rice, and increased procurement pressure further downstream. The paper also examines the subsequent disruption of rice distribution and the government's response, including the delayed release of reserve rice. The central argument is that the crisis can be better understood as a combination of price formation, collection competition, and distributional bottlenecks rather than as a straightforward production shortage.