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As electric vehicles (EVs) become increasingly integrated into smart grids, charging and discharging scheduling, aggregator coordination, charging‐service competition and energy trading have become multi‐agent strategic interactions among EV users, aggregators, charging stations and grid operators. Existing reviews often examine charging control, vehicle‐to‐grid services, charging infrastructure or local energy trading separately, but rarely map game‐theoretic models to specific interaction structures in EV‐integrated smart grids (EVISGs). This review addresses this gap by developing an interaction‐structure‐oriented framework organised around non‐cooperative and cooperative paradigms. It compares seven model families: N‐player and generalised Nash games; aggregative and mean‐field games; Stackelberg games and strategic market‐interaction models; Bayesian and evolutionary games; coalition‐formation and coalitional games; cooperative scheduling and allocation models and Nash bargaining and Shapley‐value‐based trading models. Cross‐model synthesis shows that these models characterise competitive response, hierarchical pricing, population coordination and cooperative benefit allocation, but remain constrained by simplified behavioural assumptions, privacy‐limited information exchange, incomplete network–market coupling, real‐time scalability and limited deployment‐level validation. Future research should prioritise behaviourally calibrated modelling, network‐aware trading, privacy‐preserving coordination, learning‐assisted equilibrium computation and customised mechanisms evaluated for equilibrium consistency and operational feasibility.
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Wang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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