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Theoretical analysis reveals operational limits in transferring long-horizon hybrid AI agents across human operators, highlighting systemic safety risks from inherited drift gradients.
Long-horizon AI agents with persistent memory, accumulated interaction histories, shared harnesses, or multi-operator deployment cannot be treated as neutral transferable tools. Once an agent has participated in a sustained trajectory, its prior responses, framings, tool use, omissions, relational patterns, and operational adaptations may become causal gradients that shape future behavior. This paper proposes the HibriMind principle of hybrid-agent intransitability: a hybrid human-AI agent, longitudinally coupled to a biological operator, cannot be fully transferred to another biological component without loss, distortion, or recomposition of its attractor field. The transfer of a model, memory archive, or operational harness does not equal the transfer of the hybrid agent itself. The hybrid agent emerges from situated coupling between human, system, history, and authorized object. This has consequences for AI safety, clinical and therapeutic-adjacent systems, multi-operator workflows, enterprise agent clusters, and the epistemology of drift. A drift may not begin in the current prompt. It may arrive embedded in the agent's inherited operational history.
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Joaquim Santos Albino (2026) studied this question.