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The worldwide demand for natural gas continues to surge, necessitating parallel growth in its delivery infrastructure. Extending these networks entails massive, forward-looking capital investments. Within the natural gas trade, select producers leverage stronger geographical and geopolitical positions, establishing them as leaders while consigning competitors to followers. This research proposes an analytical tool to guide capital investment decisions for realizing natural gas supply capacity expansions, as a Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader moves first and the follower moves next after observing the leader's move. In this setup, the lower layer is a Nash equilibrium problem, as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). For validation, the framework is applied to the prospective Russia-China natural gas pipeline. Russia is considered a leading player, yet Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan act as follower players in the sample scenario with existing supply capacities. The model allows analysis of natural gas supply in all current and promising modes of transportation while introducing a “dependence factor” in supplies. Findings illustrate that prices and market characteristics are becoming favorable for Russia to invest in the proposed capacity expansion, but higher supply prices would be necessary. Depending on demand, the leader may expand production to achieve between 2.85Tcf/y and 5.83 Tcf/y based on analyzed scenarios with market dependency factor considerations.
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