Presentation on functional causality: applying Lacan’s critique of organo-dynamism to neuropsychoanalysis

Although significant advances bridging neuroscience and psychoanalysis (“neuropsychoanalysis”) have proceeded in the past three decades, many remain weary of risks of reductionism. Lacanian critiques particularly emphasize the constitutive role of language and discourse in human subjectivity as incompatible with biology. While concerns over ontological reductionism have been addressed on philosophical grounds, the foundational role of discourse has arguably received less attention. The aims of this paper are twofold. First, through a close reading of Lacan’s “Presentation on Psychical Causality,” I will apply his critique of Henri Ey’s organo-dynamism to neuropsychoanalysis. This will allow me to isolate limits of Lacan’s critique and areas in neuropsychoanalysis which require deeper conceptualization. Second, I will sketch preliminary remarks for conceiving psychical causality—specifically, the functional law of identification—in neuropsychoanalytic terms. These remarks not only show how biology is open to the effects of language and discourse. They demonstrate how such effects are necessary for the formation of structure and for addressing the challenges of affective homeostasis.