The Provision of Benefits by Interest Groups in the United States

With a sample of nearly 900 voluntary associations, we give a detailed account of what membership benefits are provided by interest groups, and we place these results in the context of a typology of groups. Using a multivariate analysis of membership inducements, we show that the pursuit of collective goods by groups is not always a mere "by-product" made possible by the provision of selective material incentives, as Olson (1965) contended. Three things help groups overcome the collective goods dilemma: (1) members representing institutions are more likely than autonomous individuals to value the pursuit of collective goods; (2) group patrons and large donors who subsidize associations place a high value upon representation before government and are not interested in paying for benefits that are distributed to individual group members; and (3) once a threatening environment of policy conflict emerges, autonomous individuals are more likely to realize that cherished rights, programs, or group goals are threatened, and they are increasingly willing to join and support groups in exchange for only collective benefits. We also show that about half of the groups in Washington, DC, count institutions--not autonomous individuals--among their members, and we call for a theory of group membership that accounts for the differences among members.