III.—External and Internal Relations

IN the index to Appearance and Reality (First Edition) Mr. Bradley declares that all relations are "intrinsical"; and the following are some of the phrases by means of which he tries to explain what he means by this assertion." A relation must at both ends affect, and pass into, the being of its terms " (p.364)."Every relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms, and is, in this sense, intrinsical" (p.392)." To stand in a relation and not to be relative, to support it and yet not to be infected and undermined by it, seems out of the question " (p.142).And a good many other philosophers seem inclined to take the same view about relations which Mr. Bradley is here trying to express.Other phrases which seem to be sometimes used to express it, or a part of it, are these: "No relations are purely external" ; " All relations qualify or modify or make a difference to the terms between which they hold"; " No terms are independent of any of the relations in which they stand to other terms" (See e.g., Joachim, The Nature of Truth, pp.11, 12, 46).It is, I think, by no means easy to make out exactly what these philosophers mean by these assertions.And the main object of this paper is to try to define clearly one proposition, which, even if it does not give the whole of what they mean, seems to me to be always implied by what they mean, and to be certainly false.I shall try to make clear the exact meaning of this proposition, to point out some of its most important consequences,