Making Water Investible : Development Banking, Regulatory Governance, and the Institutional Production of Sanitation Infrastructure in Brazil

This is the authors' abstract. We don't add key points for this paper.

Why did long‐horizon private investment in Brazilian water and sanitation expand after 2016 despite fragmented authority and persistent political contestation? This article places the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) inside, rather than outside, the credible‐commitment framework. It argues that the bank operated as a credibility intermediary: it assembled service territories at investible scale, financed and coordinated project preparation, translated statutory goals into comparable contracts, and linked concessions to long‐term finance. These functions complemented courts, legislatures, the national standard‐setting role of the National Water and Basic Sanitation Agency (ANA), and post‐award supervision by infranational regulators. Process tracing of laws, concession documents, regulatory instruments, auction records, corporate filings, and attributable investor statements shows how this architecture was repeated across the Temer, Bolsonaro, and Lula administrations, albeit under different political framings. The mechanism is sequence‐sensitive but not universally necessary: Chile demonstrates an alternative route through regional utilities and a central regulator, while Colombia illustrates the continuing constraints of fragmented provision. The article also distinguishes investibility from legitimacy. Financial and contractual discipline can make commitments more legible to investors, but it neither replaces public‐law oversight nor resolves disputes over affordability, participation, and the human right to water.