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Wildlife trade affects a fifth of all extant wild species on the planet. An often-suggested supply-side intervention to reduce illegal wildlife trade is to flood the market with legal captive-bred individuals. However, this strategy only works if legal products can match illegal ones in quality and cost, parallel to robust regulations and enforcement to ensure sustainable and ethical sourcing. In this paper, we used primate trade in Brazil as our model, where legal trade of captive-bred primates has been in operation for 30 years, to assess whether captive-breeding certification could be an efficient strategy to curb illegal wildlife trade. We assessed the scope and economic aspects of contemporary legal and illegal trade in terms of species composition and number of individuals traded, prices, and market share (the proportion of a market controlled by each trade). To do so, we surveyed online trade (30 social media groups and one E-commerce platform) between 2017 and 2020, and sampled certified breeders. We estimated that annually on average 121.0 (SD 35.9) marmosets Callithrix spp., 36.0 (SD 2.0) capuchins Sapajus sp. and 1.0 (SD 0) pygmy marmoset Cebuella pygmaea were illegally traded online; while on average 14.0 (SD 17.0) individuals of Callithrix spp. and 5.3 (SD 8.4) Sapajus sp. were trade legally per year per certified breeders. Illegal sources dominated the Brazilian market share of primates as pets both in terms of units and revenues (73% and 59%, respectively) compared to the legal breeders. Illegally sourced capuchins and marmosets are four to five times cheaper than their legally-bred counterparts. Our findings show that both the higher prices of legal substitutes and supply shortages from legal sources contribute to the persistence of an illegal market of primates in Brazil. We found that the current certified primate trade in Brazil has failed in most of the criteria in the literature for the use of captive-breeding as a tool for tackling wildlife trafficking. As it stands, the legal market may be stimulating the illegal trade rather than preventing it. In addition to awareness campaigns towards consumers, novel market interventions are essential for breeders to meet the demand at a competitive price, and to avoid individuals with false permits into the commercial trade.
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Morcatty et al. (2026) studied this question.
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