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The Problem of Nonhuman Phenomenology: or, What is it Like to Be a Kinect? 2 New materialism presents an ambitious revision of key philosophical and political concepts, most notably that of the divide between human and nonhuman agents.In order to move critical inquiry outside of the labyrinths of language so that it might also attend to the material effects and actions of the nonhuman world, threads of human exceptionalism must be untangled from some of the West's most basic ontological principles.From Bruno Latour's expansion of the concept of agency to include nonhuman agents to Karen Barad's concept of the post-human performativity of intraacting matter, there has been a rapid expanse of scholarship that attests to the influential role the material plays in the mechanics of human operations, and indeed the need to dethrone the human from its central place in ethical, philosophical, and political concerns. 1 This project also often intersects and extends to analyses of the human as an explicitly material being, one physical entity amongst others, adding a new emphasis on models of human embodiment, animation, and situated perception to a robust and on-going literature of anti-Cartesian critique.2 The results of these two efforts, however, occasionally seem to be at odds, or at least suggest the emergence of further challenges in light of the heightened stakes of material vitality and specificity.For if nonhuman entities bear increasing importance as a subject and method of study, how might an understanding of their agential actions and opaque interior lives be accessed or secured without recourse to a shared material embodiment in which to ground this knowledge?Moreover, how can we evince and relate to nonhuman entities without reducing their strangeness to human caricature?New materialisms, in short, requires new epistemologies.Possible methods of inquiry can be found across disciplinary lines, though none are without their limitations.This paper addresses three such avenues.First and foremost, scientific empiricism does much to advance an understanding of nonhuman processes and motivations on physical and temporal scales that cannot be accessed from bare human observation.Technical analysis, however, arguably omits much of the interior experience of nonhuman entities and admits a great deal of human perceptual bias.As Barad notes, there is an inevitable inseparability between the observed object and the agencies of its observation as human scientists rely on phenomena rather than the objects themselves as a primary ontological unit of understanding. 3 Knowledge of agential objects thus seems to be a form of continuous intra-action, revealing sensory and quantitative information through the mediations of never-neutral apparatuses.4 Consequently, for all the insights it offers into the scale and mechanics
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Anne Pasek (2015) studied this question.
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