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In Telling More Than We Can Know, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) demonstrated the limits of one's ability to introspect about the nature of cognitive processing. Today, advancements have illuminated why one is very much conscious of some things (e.g., objects and inclinations toward them), but is less aware of other things (e.g., motor control and processing speed). We review this evidence and entertain the proposal that one can introspect about things that are important for skeletomotor action selection, but that introspection is limited regarding aspects of processing (e.g., speed) that tend to be selection-irrelevant. Accordingly, in Study 1, we present evidence that introspections about processing speed are limited and can be distorted by processing dynamics. We also investigated whether conflict-related urges can be weakened experimentally, and whether people can introspect about these effects (Study 2). We discuss how assessing these introspective limitations is of central importance in social cognition.
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Berger et al. (2016) studied this question.
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