Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Rawls’s remarks on self-respect have been described as cryptic or ambiguous. The discussion on the meaning of respect and, specifically, Rawlsian self-respect has been considerably influenced by Darwall’s distinction between recognition respect and appraisal respect. This paper defends that Darwall’s dichotomic misses an important dimension of Rawlsian self-respect which can be termed “value-confidence”. This third kind of self-respect concerns one’s confidence in the value of the particular conception of the good one has chosen. Value-confidence differs from recognition self-respect, even if both dimensions are intimately connected. The distinction between recognition self-respect and value-confidence resembles the dual nature of moral personality in Rawls and the different roles of basic institutions and communities of interests.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jorge Crego (2022) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: