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As part of a scientific research and development project, the radionuclide fingerprint of an operating advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) has been studied across several facets (Goodwin et al., 2024). One part of this project was to deploy an array of radioxenon samplers to the region to measure any radioxenon emissions from the reactors of the Hartlepool nuclear power station at a range of tens of kilometres. The array of three sensors was operational for around 12 months from March 2022 and detected many occurrences of isotopes of radioxenon. Here we provide a detailed analysis and interpretation of the data and where possible, attribution of detections to a source or region. A combination of different types of atmospheric dispersion modelling techniques, including the use of stack monitoring data from nearby civilian radioxenon-emitting nuclear facilities has enabled the majority of detections to be attributed to one or more possible sources. Whilst emissions from Hartlepool have been detected on the systems, the majority of detections are associated with a medical isotope production facility in Fleurus, Belgium. • Completed measurement campaign using SAUNA Q B radioxenon sampler systems. • Analysed data from systems to identify detections of Xe-133, Xe-131m, Xe-133m. • Several hundred detections were associated with possible likely radioxenon emitters. • Identified sources ranged from local (Hartlepool NPP) to Eastern Europe and beyond. • STAX data from several sources was used in the analysis, as well as several Atmospheric Transport Modelling techniques.
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Goodwin et al. (2025) studied this question.
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