Greenland as a Strategic Asset: A Multi-Domain Analysis of NATO and United States Security Imperatives in the Arctic Era

The Arctic has undergone a dramatic transformation from a post-Cold War 'zone of peace' (Heininen, 2020) to an arena of renewed strategic competition among great powers. Russia has substantially rebuilt and expanded its Arctic military infrastructure since 2014, reopening Soviet-era bases and deploying advanced S-400 air defense systems along its northern flank (Huebert, 2019; Konyshev & Sergunin, 2014). China declared itself a 'near-Arctic state' in 2018 and has pressed for transit rights and infrastructure investment across the circumpolar region (Brady, 2017; Lanteigne, 2019). The February 2026 United States–Denmark–Greenland Security Agreement moved Greenland to the center of NATO's strategic debate by extending adversary exclusion to economic investment and prohibiting adversary mining and infrastructure development. Despite this heightened salience, no rigorous, reproducible, multi-domain framework has existed for comparing Arctic candidate locations' strategic value. This study develops and applies the Multi-Domain Strategic Value (MDSV) index to assess the comparative strategic value of Greenland (Pituffik Space Base), Iceland (Keflavik NAS), Norway (Andøya), and Canada (Alert, Nunavut) for NATO and United States security imperatives. The research employs a sequential explanatory mixed methods design integrating fourteen datasets comprising 2,738 records across six sub-indices: geospatial-polar access, space/cyber/electromagnetic spectrum, maritime domain control, economic-industrial capacity, diplomatic-legal framework, and military infrastructure readiness. Expert-weighted scoring was applied across four weighting scenarios to test the robustness of findings. Results demonstrate that Pituffik (Greenland) scores 8.08 and ranks first in three of four scenarios. Keflavik (Iceland) scores 5.87 overall but achieves Rank 1 only under a maritime-dominant weighting scenario (7.07). Andøya (Norway) scores 5.87. Alert (Canada) scores 1.10 and ranks fourth across all scenarios. Supporting empirical findings include a 37.2% decline in Arctic sea ice extent from 7.19 million square kilometers in 1979–1989 to 4.52 million square kilometers in 2020–2024; an 828% increase in Northern Sea Route cargo volume from 3.90 million to 36.20 million tonnes between 2013 and 2023; Russia's icebreaker fleet dominance with seven nuclear and twelve total heavy-class vessels compared to NATO's three heavy-class and zero nuclear icebreakers; Denmark's first Wales target compliance in 2023 at 2.42% of GDP, Norway's first compliance in 2024 at 2.09%, and Canada's persistent shortfall at 1.31%; and the 2026 Agreement's qualitative deepening of the strategic relationship beyond traditional defense cooperation. The findings indicate that Greenland provides non-replicable geospatial and polar-arc strategic advantages for ballistic missile early warning and Arctic domain awareness, while Keflavik offers a complementary architecture for maritime chokepoint control in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap. The 2026 Agreement represents a qualitative evolution in U.S.–Denmark–Greenland strategic alignment, extending deterrence into the economic domain. Policy recommendations favor a distributed but Greenland-anchored Arctic posture that leverages Pituffik's unique positional advantages while maintaining Iceland's maritime surveillance capabilities and deepening interoperability with Norway.