Institutional Decay and Public Interest Reform in Bangladesh

Bangladesh has an extensive formal architecture for corporate, banking, financial-reporting and market governance, yet recurring institutional failures indicate a persistent gap between rules and effective accountability. This policy paper examines that gap through a structured documentary analysis of legislation, regulatory instruments, governance codes, professional standards, institutional reports and implementation evidence. It compares the Bangladeshi framework with selected governance arrangements in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union, while using international standards on internal control, professional ethics, sustainability and responsible business conduct as supplementary benchmarks. The analysis argues that major governance failures are best understood not as isolated acts of misconduct but as interacting weaknesses in ownership transparency, board independence, related-party controls, audit quality, supervisory enforcement and professional accountability. The case studies are used as illustrations of recurring institutional patterns rather than as substitutes for judicial findings or transaction-level forensic evidence. The paper proposes a coordinated reform programme covering directors’ duties, fit-and-proper assessment, board and committee independence, connected-lending controls, audit inspection, regulatory coordination, whistleblower protection, enforcement transparency and sustainability governance. Its central conclusion is that adopting additional rules will not be sufficient unless Bangladesh also strengthens institutional independence, evidence-based supervision and credible consequences for non-compliance