This study explains why technically sound interpretations, formal incident declarations and authorized decisions may still fail to produce timely action when cybersecurity response capabilities are distributed across organizational actors. A bounded open-index integrative search is combined with a structured qualitative cross-case comparison of 16 decision units across 15 public cases and 11 jurisdictions. The selected cases illustrate four case-bounded, sensitizing configurations: technically credible warning signs that do not reach institutional escalation; formal activation alongside distributed execution; connections or gaps between decision authority and material capability; and supplier-notification dependencies alongside retained organizational accountability. The framework proposes an audit organized around specific decision objects, escalation rules, activation triggers and execution levers. This is a preprint and has not been peer reviewed.
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Federico Pacheco (2026) studied this question.
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