This article reassesses the evidence for fables in the forensic and deliberative oratory of Classical Greece. With analyses of Aristophanes, Aristotle and the Attic orators, it challenges conventional assumptions about fables’ ubiquity in rhetoric of the Classical period. The study advances three arguments: first, attestations of the fable as a standard feature of rhetorical argumentation, or as having been told by the Classical orators, cannot be proven prior to the first century CE. Second, pre-Imperial testimonia on fable-telling in Classical oratory depict exceptional circumstances that deviate from normative rhetorical contexts. Third, to the extent that fables did appear in Classical oratory, they functioned as techniques of final recourse to persuade audiences when other arguments had failed or been forbidden. This article also reveals an association between rhetorical fables and death penalty cases.
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Jacqueline Arthur-Montagne (2026) studied this question.
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