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There is an essential connection between the concept of an ability and various forms of practical and cognitive success. In particular, it is in virtue of exercising their abilities that agents’ general practical and cognitive endeavors, their doings and believings, become achievements—intentional actions or instances of knowledge. Abilities enable success. In this paper, I challenge the ubiquitous idea that when agents succeed, they are exercising the ability to succeed , that is, that abilities enable success as abilities to succeed. My argument is that while achievements are highly specific, the content of what an ability is an ability to do (its prejacent) is always general. Hence, the relevant achievements never appear in the prejacents of abilities exercised in achievement; there are no abilities to succeed. I draw out some general lessons for the philosophy of abilities.
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David Heering (2026) studied this question.
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