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Autonomous mobile agents combine an untrusted or potentially compromised decision process with actions that can produce effects through mobile application interfaces. Existing mobile access-control mechanisms and agent-level controls operate at different enforcement layers. This paper studies a narrower and operationally testable question: whether a runtime execution-authority boundary can prevent an unauthorized agent request from producing a bounded application effect after compromise.We present DROS-Mobile, an execution-governance design that separates an agent request from the authorization decision and from the subsequent bounded action boundary. We define an execution-boundary invariant for unauthorized execution, together with positive-path and revocation contracts for the declared application-runtime boundary. We then evaluate a declared Android application-runtime target: a Pixel_7 Android Virtual Device running Android 34 on x86_64. The evaluation uses an app-side ingress receiver, a deterministic dispatcher, a bounded fixture, raw event records, and immutable evidenceclosure artifacts. Three security-semantics units establish a grant--enforce--revoke lifecycle. Two decisionpath measurements provide an allow/deny comparison. Finally, an accounting-backed 2/4/8-concurrency series characterizes observed decision latency and hostobserved throughput. The evidence supports a bounded conclusion. On the declared Pixel_7 AVD application-runtime path, unauthorized requests were denied before the bounded fixture started, authorized requests produced the expected bounded effect, and a revoked authority produced no subsequent effect. Under the declared measurement protocol, the 2/4/8 runs provide a reproducibledescriptive performance series. The results do not establish Android-wide security, Android operating-system enforcement, SELinux or Binder properties, physical-device energy behavior, scalability laws, or causal explanations for the observed latencytails.自主行動代理人將可能不受信任或已遭受陷的決策程序,與能透過行動應用程式介面產生效果的行動結合。本研究聚焦一個較窄且可操作驗證的問題:在代理人控制器遭受攻陷後,執行權能邊界是否仍能阻止未授權請求產生受界定的應用程式效果。我們提出DROS-Mobile, 一種將代理人請求、授權決策與後續受界定action boundary 分離的執行治理設計。我們針對未授權執行定義執行邊界invariant, 並為宣告的application-runtime boundary 定義positive-path 與revocation contract。實驗目標固定為Pixel_7 Android Virtual Device、Android 34、x86_64。評測使用app-side ingress receiver、deterministic dispatcher、bounded fixture、原始事件記錄與不可變 evidence-closure artifacts。三個security-semantics units 建立grant--enforce--revoke lifecycle;兩個decision-path measurements 提供allow/deny 比較;最後以accounting-backed 的2/4/8 concurrency series 描述觀測到的decision latency 與host-observed throughput。在明確邊界下, 證據支持以下結論: 於宣告的Pixel_7 AVD application-runtime path,未授權請求在bounded fixture 開始前被拒絕;有效授權產生預期的bounded effect;撤銷後的authority不再產生後續effect。在宣告的measurement protocol 下,2/4/8 runs 提供可重現的descriptive performance series。本研究不建立Android-wide security、Android operating system enforcement、SELinux 或Binder 性質、實體裝置能耗、scalability law,亦不對latency tail 作因果歸因。
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Chun-Cheng (Jimmy) Chen (2026) studied this question.
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