This paper considers the yearly maintenance scheduling of generating units within a market environment. Each producer schedules its units' maintenance periods to maximize its revenue using a bilevel approach. The upper-level problem of this bilevel model seeks maximum revenue and contains unit scheduling constraints, while the lower-level problems represent the market clearing process under different operating conditions. This single producer maintenance problem can be recast as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Since the MPECs of all producers have to be considered simultaneously and the market clearing process is common to all of them, the proposed formulation for maintenance scheduling is an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) corresponding to a multiple-leader-common-follower game. The solution of this EPEC is a set of equilibria, in which none of the producers is able to increase its revenue unilaterally by changing the maintenance periods of its generating units.
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Pandžić et al. (2012) studied this question.
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